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Abstract 
In an instance of the stable marriage problem of size n, n men and n women 
each ranks members of the opposite sex in order of preference. A stable marriage 
is a complete matching M = {(mi, WiJ, (m2, Wi2 ), ••• , (mn, Win)} such that no 
unmatched man and woman prefer each other to their partners in M. 
A pair (mi, Wj) is stable if it is contained in some stable marriage. In this paper, 
we prove that determining if an arbitrary pair is stable requires it( n 2 ) time in the 
worst case. We show, by an adversary argument, that there exists instances of 
the stable marriage problem such that it is possible to find at least one pair that 
exhibits the n(n2 ) lower bound. 
As corollaries of our results, the lower bound of it( n 2 ) is established for several 
stable marriage related problems. Knuth, in his treatise on stable marriage, asks 
if there is an algorithm that finds a stable marriage in less than 8( n 2) time. Our 
results show that such an algorithm does not exist. 
Introduction 
Lower Bounds for 
the Stable Marria~e Problem 
and its Variants 
An instance of the stable marriage problem involves two disjoint sets of equal car-
dinality n, the men denoted by mi's and women denoted by Wi's. Each individual 
ranks all members of the opposite sex in order of decreasing preference. It is useful 
to represent these preferences in two n x n integer matrices MP and WP such 
that the ith row of MP (WP) gives the preferences of mj ( Wi)· For example, 
MP[i,j] =kif mi's jth preference is Wk· 
Two other useful matrices in a problem instance are the ranking matrices, denoted 
MR and WR. An entry in the men's ranking matrix, MR[i,j], gives the ranking 
(position of preference) of Wj by mj. The preference and ranking matrices play the 
roles of inverses for each other because MP[i, MR[i,j]] = j and MR[i, MP[i,j]] = j. 
Given MP (WP), it is possible to determine MR (WR) completely, and vice versa. 
We will use the notations MP, MR, WP, WR only when the problem instance 
associated with these matrices can be clearly determined from context. When 
there is a possibility of ambiguity, we use the notations MPs, MRs, WPs, W~s 
where S denotes a specific instance of the stable marriage problem. 
A matching M = {(mi, w;i), (m2, w;2 ), ••• , (mn, WiJ} is a stable marriage if there 
does not exist an unmatched man-woman pair ( m;, Wj) such that both prefer each 
other to their partners in M. At least one stable marriage exists for any given 
problem instance. In most problem instances, there exists more than one stable 
marriage. Moreover, there are problem instances of size n where the number of 
stable marriages are exponential in n (1186] (KN76]. 
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Gale and Shapley first proved that a stable marriage exists for any problem instance 
and gave the following algorithm to find it. 
Gale-Shapley algorithm [GS62]. 
Initially, all men belong to the set B of bachelors. A man is removed from 
B by being engaged to a woman but may subsequently return to B if his 
fiancee breaks the engagement. 
The algorithm iterates the following steps until Bis empty. 
Step 1: Select an mi and remove him from B. 
Step 2: mi asks for an engagement from Wj, the woman highest on his 
preference which he has not previously asked. 
Step 3: The reply of Wj falls into one of three cases: 
a) if Wj is not engaged, she accepts mi's request for engage-
ment, 
b) else if w j is currently engaged to a man she prefers to mi, 
she rejects the request and returns mi to B, 
c) otherwise Wj breaks her current engagement, returns her 
fiance to B, and accepts mi's request for engagement. 
When B is empty, the matching represented by the engagements is a stable 
marriage. 
The stable marriage derived from the algorithm is independent of the selection 
process used to pick mi in Step 1. In a variation developed by McVitie and Wilson 
[MW71 J, mi is selected such that i is minimized over all remaining men in B. If 
the previous iteration ended in Step 3(b) or 3( c ), the Mc Vi tie-Wilson selection 
criterion picks the man last returned to B by that step. Otherwise, no current 
member of B has yet participated in the algorithm, and the man currently holding 
the smallest subscript in B is selected. 
The stable marriage derived from the Gale-Shapley algorithm is male-optimal. It 
has been shown that no man can receive a better match in any other stable marriage 
for the same problem instance [GS62]. By reversing the roles of men and women, 
the algorithm finds the female-optimal stable marriage. 
Step 2 of the algorithm is implemented efficiently in 0(1) time by considering 
entries of MP in order. Step 3 also runs in 0(1) time by looking up WR and keeping 
track of the current engagement of each woman. The worst-case asymptotic time 
complexity of the entire algorithm is bounded by the number of iterations and has 
been shown to be O(n2) [IT78] [KN76]. 
A man-woman pair (mi, Wj) is stable if it is contained in some stable marriage. 
Gusfield [Gu87] gives an O(n2) algorithm that finds all stable pairs in a problem 
instance. It is easy to adapt Gusfield's algorithm for use in determining if an 
arbitrary pair is stable. 
We conclude this section with a lemma proved by Irving and Leather [IL86]. 
Lemma 1. (Irving and Leather) 
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In a given instance of the stable marriage problem, if man m and woman w are 
partners in some stable marriage S then 
a) There is no stable marriage S' in which both m and w have worse partners. 
b) There is no stable marriage S' in which both m and w have better partners. 
Model of Computation 
One of the bottlenecks of stable marriage algorithms is the pre-processing needed 
for the men's and women's preferences. If it is necessary to input or set up the 
preference and ranking matrices, then D(n2 ) operations are required even before 
the algorithm proper begins its execution. 
It is interesting to investigate if the stable marriage problem can be solved without 
examining all the preferences. Knuth, in one of the twelve research problems posed 
in his treatise on stable marriage [KN76], asks if there is an algorithm that finds a 
stable marriage, such that the core of the algorithm (as oppose to setting up the 
preferences) runs in o( n 2) (less than 0( n 2)) time. In a related problem, Gusfield 
[Gu87] asks if it is possible to determine in o(n2 ) time if an arbitrary complete 
matching is stable. Our results answer both questions in the negative. 
The model of computation used in our investigation of lower bounds excludes the 
time needed to set up the preference and ranking matrices. Instead, we assume 
that the matrices MP, WP, MR, WR are already available. The algorithm may 
query any entry in these matrices and receive an answer in 0(1) time. 
Adversary Strategy 
Adversary argument is a general approach for showing lower bounds. When applied 
to a problem X, it can be modeled as a game involving two persons, the algorithm 
and adversary, making alternate moves. During her moves, the algorithm asks 
questions to gain information about X. Her overall goal is to minimize the number 
of questions needed to obtain sufficient information for solving X. 
The adversary is obliged to answer the algorithm's question made during her pre-
vious move. His goal is to slow the algorithm by behaving uncooperatively, giving 
redundant answers whenever feasible. Although the answers must be incrementally 
consistent, he is free to construct a 'tricky' instance of X as the game proceeds. 
Benefiting from the assembled knowledge of questions already committed by the· 
algorithm, he chooses replies that make the remaining task of the algorithm as 
time consuming as possible. 
For every size n, our adversary uses a special instance of the stable marriage 
problem which we call the canonical instance and denote by C. The pair (mn, wn) 
is stable in C. There exists a large family of other problem instances that differ 
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only slightly from C; yet, the differences are sufficient to cause (mn, Wn) to be not 
stable. We show later how to construct such a problem instance which we called a 
minimally non-canonical instance and denote by rvC. 
The adversary's strategy is to answer queries according to the preference matrices 
of C. To conclude that (mn, wn) is stable, an algorithm must determine that no 
potential candidate for rvC agrees with those preferences in C that the adversary 
has revealed in answers to queries. However, C is constructed to provide a large 
number of possible rvCs each derivable with only minor changes to C. Hence, the 
algorithm must make a large number of queries to eliminate all potential rvCs, 
supporting our lower bound claim. 
We now define the women's preference matrix WP C· Entries in WP c are defined 
by the function WP c[i,'j] = j as illustrated in Figure 1. 
(i 
2 
D 2 2 
Figure 1. Women's preference matrix WPc. 
We note a property of WP c due to its construction. If a woman receives proposals 
from two different men, her decision always favors the man with the smaller 
subscript. This observation permits a simpler application of the Gale-Shapley 
algorithm that uses the McVitie-Wilson selection criterion. When mi is selecte'd 
in Step 1 for the first time, all men with subscripts greater than i have yet to 
participate in the algorithm. Hence, Step 3( c) never occurs because it requires 
that Wj be first engaged to mk before receiving a proposal from mi where k > i. 
In other words, a woman never changes her mind once she accepts an engagement. 
It follows that Steps 2 and 3 are reduced to scanning, in decreasing order, mi's 
preferences and matching him with the first woman that is not engaged. We 
refer to this special version as the restricted Gale-Shapley algorithm in subsequent 
discussions. 
The following lemma is another consequence of WP e's construction. 
Lemma 2. 
Regardless of the men's preferences, any problem instance that has WP c as the 
women's preference matrix yields exactly one stable marriage. 
Proof: Any stable marriage is represented in WP c by exactly one entry in each 
column. In particular, this is true of the male-optimal stable marriage S derived 
by applying the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Since S is male-optimal, if there exists 
another stable marriage S', every man that receives a different match now has a 
1 
2 
3 
n-2 
n-1 
n 
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less preferable partner. By Lemma 1 (part a), every woman in S' has the same 
or a more preferable partner than in S. Therefore, the subscript of each woman's 
partner decreases or stays the same. However, this requires that some column in 
WP c be represented in S' by more than one entry. We conclude that S' does not 
exist. I 
Entries in the men's preference matrix MPc fall into three groups. The first group, 
underlined in Figure 2, includes the first row, last row and tridiagonal entries of the 
remaining rows. The first and last rows consist of the integers 1 to n in increasing 
order. The tridiagonal entries of row i are the integers i, n, and i - 1 in that order. 
1 2 3 4 5 i-1 i i+l i+2 n-3 n-2 n-1 
1 2. 2 1: 
-
n-2 n-1 
2 n. 1 3 4 
1 ~ n. 2. 4 
1 2 i-2 n. i-1 i+l 
1 2 n-4 n-2 n. n-3 
1 2 n-3 n-1 n. 
1 2 ~ 4 
-
n-2 n-1 
Figure 2. Men's preference matrix MP C· 
Of the remaining entries, the group left of the tridiagonals consists of integers 1 to 
i - 2 in increasing order. The group right of the tridiagonals consists of integers 
i + 1 to n - 1 also arranged in increasing order. 
Lemma 3. 
( mn, wn) is a stable pair in C. 
Proof: Apply the restricted Gale-Shapley algorithm to C. Scanning the ith row 
of MPc, note that all entries to the left of i have values less than i. These entries 
represent those women who have already accepted engagements in previous rows. 
Hence, mi's stable partner is Wiand {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), ... , (mn, wn)} is a stable 
marriage in C. I 
n 
n. 
n-l 
n-l 
n-1 
n-1 
n-2 
n. 
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Obtaining Non-canonical Instances 
Starting with C, we obtain a "'C by selecting a row i of MPc such that 3 Si::; n-2 
and exchanging two special entries, l and r, in that row. All entries left of the 
tridiagonal are candidates for l but only those right of the tridiagonal with values 
that differ from i by odd numbers are candidates for r. Note that l is equal to its 
column number, and r's column number is r + 1. 
To formalize the above construction, we define, for each i, two sets of integers 
Li = { x I 1 S x S i - 2 } , and 
Ri = { x I i + 1 S x S n - 1 and x ;/=. i (mod 2) } . 
Then, for any i, l, and r satisfying 3 S i ::; n - 2, l E Li, and r E Ri; we define 
MP ,..,,c[i, l] = r, MP ,..,,c[i, r + 1] = l, and all other entries of MP ,..,,c and WP ,..,,care 
equal to their corresponding entries in MPc and WPc. 
Lemma 4. 
(fin, Wn) is not a stable pair in "'C. 
Proof: Apply the restricted Gale-Shapley algorithm to rvC. Figure 3 illustrates 
the stable marriage that results. 
• fik is matched with Wk for 1 S k S i -1 because these rows are unchanged 
from C. 
• fii is matched with Wr. Note that r ;/=. i (mod 2), which guarantees that 
there is an even number of rows between row i and row r. 
• For i + 1 S k S r - 1, fik is matched with Wk if k ;/=. i (mod 2) and fik 
is matched with Wk-2 if k = i (mod 2). Note that fir-2 is matched with 
Wr-2 and fir-1 is matched with Wr-3· 
The above discussion shows that wi, w2, ... , Wi-1 have accepted engagements in 
rows 1 to i-1; Wi, Wi+i, ... , Wr-2 have accepted engagements in rows i + 1 to r-1 
and Wr has accepted an engagement in row i. The subscripts of these women 
account for every entry left of the diagonal entry n in row r. Hence, fir is engaged 
to Wn. 
"'C has only one stable marriage by Lemma 2. Since Wn is married to fir and 
not fin in this marriage, (fin, wn) is not a stable pair. I 
Under the rules of the adversary argument, the adversary cannot renege on a reply 
to an earlier query. Hence, the l and r values, which are exchanged during the 
construction of .....,c, cannot originate from entries that the algorithm had queried. 
However, the large number of valid choices of i, l and r gives us the following 
bound. 
1 2 3 ... l . .. i-2 i-1 't i+l i+2 . .. r-3 r-2 r-1 r 
1 I m 2 3 2 rn n 1 
3 1 rn n 
i-1 1 2 ... . .. D n i-2 
't 1 2 ... 0 . .. i n i-1 
i+l 1 2 ... . .. i-1 Ji+ 1 J n i 
i+2 1 2 ... . .. i-1 [I] i+2 n i+l 
i+3 1 2 ... . .. i+l Ji+ 3J n 
i+4 1 2 ... . .. i+l Ji+ 21 i+4 
. 
r-2 1 2 ... 
. .. ~ n r-3 r-1 1 2 ... . .. r-1 n r-2 3 
r 1 2 ... r-3 r-2 r BJ 
Figure 3. Stable marriage in rvC. 
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Lemma 5. 
If n = 3k + 4 for some integer k 2: 1, the minimum number of queries needed to 
eliminate all valid constructions of ""Cs is ~ k ( k + 1). 
Proof: To eliminate row i from participating in the construction of a ""C, the al-
gorithm must query either all of Li or all of Ri. To eliminate all valid constructions 
of ""Cs, all rows must be eliminated. 
i-2 < k < r(2k + 1)/21 < r(n - i - 1)/21 
for 3 S i S k + 2, and 
i-2 > k+1 > r2k/21 > r(n-i-1)/21 
for k + 3 S i S n - 2. 
Therefore the minimum number of queries needed 
n-2 
= L min(ILd, IRii) 
i=3 
k+2 n-2 
= L ILil + L IRil 
i=3 i=k+3 
k+2 n-2 
=l:(i-2)+ 2= r(n-i-1);21 
i=3 i=k+3 
k+2 3k+2 
= l:(i - 2) + 2= r(3k + 3 - i)/21 
i=3 i=k+3 
k k 
=l:J+2:2J 
j=l j=l 
3 
= 2k(k + 1). I 
Lower Bounds Results 
We are now ready to state our main result. 
Theorem. 
Determining if an arbitrary pair is stable in a problem instance of size n requires 
n( n 2 ) time in the worst case. 
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Proof: Without loss of generality, we may assume that n = 3k + 4 for some 
integer k ~ 1; otherwise, we extend the problem instance by adding the appropriate 
number of men and women. 
By Lemmas 3 and 4, we show that it is necessary to distinguish between e and 
"-'e in order to determine if (mn, wn) is stable. By Lemma 5, any algorithm that 
distinguishes between e and "-'e must make at least !k(k + 1) = !(n34 )(n34 +1) 
queries. Hence, the number of queries necessary is O(n2). I 
Corollary 1. 
The asymptotic time complexity for determining if an arbitrary pair is stable in a 
problem instance of size n is 8(n2). 
Proof: Corollary 1 follows from the theorem and our earlier note that Gusfield's 
algorithm solves this problem in O(n2 ) time. I 
Corollary 2. 
The asymptotic time complexity for finding a stable marriage in a given problem 
instance of size n is 8(n2). 
Proof: We noted earlier that Gale-Shapley algorithm runs in O(n2 ) time. The 
only stable marriage in e is different from the only stable marriage in ,..,_,e and 
0( n 2) queries are required to distinguish between them. I 
Corollary 3. 
The asymptotic time complexity for determining if an arbitrary complete match-
ing {(mi, Wii), (m2, Wi2 ), ... , (mn, Win)} is a stable marriage in a given problem 
instance of size n is 8( n2). 
Proof: There is an obvious O(n2) algorithm for solving this problem described 
by Gusfield [Gu87, p 127]. The matching {(m1,w1), (m2,w2), ... , (mn,wn)} is a 
stable marriage in e but not in "-'e and 0( n2) queries are required to distinguish 
between them. I 
Conclusions 
We have shown that the lower bound of O(n2) holds for three stable marriage 
related problems. This lower bound is fundamental to stable marriage and holds 
for other related problems, such as, the stable 'roommates' problem [IR85] and 
an entire class of stable marriage problem variants defined as follows. Given an 
instance of the stable marriage problem X, we define a real-valued function V 
whose domain is the set of stable marriages in X. The problem of of finding a 
stable marriage M that maximizes (or minimizes) V ( M) has a lower bound of 
n(n2 ), by an argument similar to that of Corollary 2. By varying the definition of 
V, we can formulate different stable marriage problem variants. 
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Most of the problems that we have described can be solved using existing algorithms 
that run in O(n2 ) time. Our lower bound implies that these algorithms are 
asymptotically optimal. However, a notable exception is the 'optimal' stable 
marriage problem (ILG87], which is a member of the class of problems we have 
just described. In this problem, two functions um(i,j) and uw(i,j) are defined 
for every pair (mi, Wj ). These functions represent respectively the 'unhappiness' 
ratings given by mi and Wj to any stable marriage that pairs them together. The 
problem is to find a stable marriage M that minimizes V(M), which is defined to 
be the sum of um's and uw's over all pairs in M. A solution represents an 'optimal' 
stable marriage in an egalitarian sense, which maximizes the overall happiness of 
all participants. An algorithm that runs in 0( n4 log n) time is given in (ILG87]; the 
interesting open question of whether there exists an asymptotically faster algorithm 
is also raised. Our results only show a lower bound of il(n2). 
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